Trusted hardware,
scrutinised.

Trusted Execution Environments are becoming a standard feature of modern processors. Intel SGX, AMD SEV, and Arm TrustZone each isolate computation at a different level — from part of a single process to an entire virtual machine — but they share the same core capability: a program can run inside one of these environments so that not even the operator of the machine can see its instructions or data. Not the cloud provider hosting it, not the host operating system, not another process running alongside it can read or alter what's inside. This is what makes a TEE a form of trusted hardware: the guarantee comes from the chip itself, verified through attestation, rather than from trusting whoever administers the server it runs on.

Isolation doesn't hold on its own. It depends on a set of components — the enclave boundary, the attestation stack, the key-management primitives around it — being implemented and used correctly by the system built on top of them. Get this right and a TEE delivers two things: confidentiality, so nothing outside the enclave can read what's inside, and integrity, so nothing outside it can alter how it runs. Get it wrong — say, handing over key material before attestation completes, or trusting an attestation result the system never actually checked — and either can silently fail. Our consulting work looks at exactly this: whether each component is implemented as specified, and whether the system uses it the way it's meant to.